Reliability of sequential systems using the cause-consequence diagram method by L.M. Ridley (7119803) & J.D. Andrews (7120562)
1Reliability of Sequential Systems using the Cause-Consequence
Diagram Method
L.M.Ridley and J.D.Andrews
Department of Mathematical Sciences
Loughborough University
Loughborough
Leicestershire
LE11 3TU
Keywords: Cause-Consequence Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Dependencies
Summary
In many industrial systems, where safety is of the utmost importance, it is necessary
that expedient tools for accident analysis are available and employed at the design
stage.  Such tools must be able to handle large systems in a systematic way and
display the factors that are of vital importance for the functionality of the system.
The technique of fault tree analysis is commonly used to assess the failure probability
of such systems.  The fault tree represents the failure logic of the system in an
inverted tree structure and has the advantage that it provides very good documentation
of the way the failure logic was developed.  Conventional fault tree quantification
requires a number of assumptions regarding the system.  One of these is that the basic
events in the tree occur independently.  This condition is not satisfied when sequential
failures are encountered.  Employing alternative methods, such as Markov methods,
can result in the loss of the documentation that represents the failure logic of the
system.
The Cause-Consequence Diagram method is a tool which, like Fault Tree Analysis,
documents the failure logic but has the extra capability enabling the analysis of
systems subject to sequential failures.  In addition the Cause-Consequence diagram
identifies the complete set of systems responses to any given initiating event.
This paper is concerned with the Cause-Consequence Diagram method and its
application to sequentially operating systems.  It extends the previous work
conducted by providing more rigorous guidelines to enable the construction of the
diagram and an analysis methodology which can be used when dependencies exist
between the events featured in the decision boxes.  A new symbol which distinguishes
between events which exist at a specified point in time and those which occur at that
time is introduced to facilitate the analysis.
21. Introduction
When investigating potential accident sequences, the time between the occurrences of
events can be an important parameter (1).  This type of system could be characterised
as one with various shutdown mechanisms that are initiated given the presence of
some initiating event, e.g. a pressure limit is exceeded.  In order to identify all relevant
accidents for a such a system Nielsen stated that the safety assessment tool used must
be able to determine the possible causes of the accident event and identify the possible
consequences given that one or more of the accident limiting provisions could fail.
The technique of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)(7) is commonly used to assess the
probability of failure of industrial systems.  This method represents the failure logic
of the system in an inverted tree structure and provides very good documentation of
the way that the system failure logic was developed.  The FTA technique however is
incapable of identifying both the possible causes of an undesirable event AND all the
possible consequences resulting from it.  In addition to this the FTA method cannot
accurately analyse systems containing sequential failures.  Markov models (8) do not
require the assumption of independence, as with the FTA method, and can therefore
be used to accurately analyse sequential failures.  This modelling technique describes
the system in a state-transition diagram.  The state-transition diagram is not as easy to
construct as a fault tree and contains no textual description regarding the failure logic
of the system.  As with the FTA method the Markov analysis method has the ability
to identify the possible causes of the undesirable events yet is incapable of identifying
all the possible consequences resulting from it.
A technique has been developed that possesses the ability to identify the causes of an
undesired event and from this event develop all possible system consequences.  The
technique is known as the Cause-Consequence Diagram method.  The Cause-
Consequence Diagram method was developed at RISO National laboratories,
Denmark, in the 1970’s to specifically aid in the reliability and risk analysis of nuclear
power plants in Scandinavian countries (9).  The method was created to assist in the
cause-consequence accident analysis of the nuclear plants, which involved
identification of the potential modes of failure of individual components and then
relating these causes to the ultimate consequences for the system (2).  The method can
be seen as superior to Event Tree Analysis (ETA) (9), which is also capable of
identifying all consequences of a given critical event, as it models at component level
and therefore is functionality driven and not subsystem driven.  In addition to this the
Cause-Consequence Diagram method can account for time delays, which is not a
feature available in the ETA method.  Nielsen stated that as well as being a tool for
illustrating the consequences of particular failures the method could also serve as a
basis from which the probability of occurrence of the individual consequences could
be evaluated.  The consequences evaluated include those that illustrate the system
functioning as intended and those that illustrate an undesirable failure sequence.
Several authors have used the technique as the main analysis tool for a safety
assessment (3,4,5,6).  The documentation, however, of the quantification of the
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rigorous definitions of the meaning of the symbols to enable quantification is yet to be
developed.  This is the subject considered in this paper.  Rules for construction and
quantification of the cause-consequence diagram have been developed and applied to
an industrial system.
The quantification method developed can be automated for computerized system
assessment and has the capability to deal with dependencies, which can occur when
analysing systems whose operation is sequential.  These dependencies include
component failures that are repeated as causes of more than one decision box event.
The occurrence of such a common event therefore influences the outcome of more than
one of the decision boxes in any path.  A second class of dependent events
encompasses those events whose failures are inconsistent and the occurrence of a
specific component failure mode excludes the possibilities of other components
failing, which feature in other parts of the diagram and are therefore mutually
exclusive.
2. The Cause-Consequence Diagram Method
The main principle of the cause-consequence diagram technique is based on the
occurrence of a critical event, i.e. an event that disturbs the balance of the process
plant.  The identification of the critical event is problem dependent and choosing the
correct place to start is important as there are very many possible initial events, not
all of which have serious consequences.  Focus should therefore only be made on
functional failures of process components that directly affect the plant balance.  Once
a critical event has been identified all relevant causes of the critical event and potential
consequences are developed using two conventional reliability analysis methods.  This
situation is represented in figure 1.
Figure 1 Simple Representation of a Cause-Consequence Diagram Structure
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4The two reliability analysis tools used in the development of the cause-consequence
diagram method are the FTA method and the ETA method.  The FTA method is used
in two independent situations to describe the causes of an undesired event.  Firstly the
technique is used to describe the causes of the critical event.  The second function for
the fault tree method is to describe the failure causes of the accident-limiting systems
(emergency shut-down systems).  The event tree method is used as the link between
the causes of the critical event and the various consequences that could result.  The
method is used to identify the various paths that the system could take, following the
critical event, depending on whether certain subsystems/components function
correctly or not.
The relationship between the two reliability methods is shown in figure 2.
                   Figure 2 Basic Structure of a Cause-Consequence Diagram
3. Symbols for Construction
The symbols used for the construction of a cause-consequence diagram are depicted in
table 1.
The overall structure of the cause-consequence diagram method is depicted in figure 3.
CAUSE PART: FAULT
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CRITICAL EVENT
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AND GATE:
Allows causality to pass up through the
tree if at any time all inputs to the gate
occur.
                        
OR GATE :
Allows causality to pass up through the
tree if at any time at least one input to
the gate occurs
SYMBOL FOR CONSEQUENCE
DIAGRAM
FUNCTION DESCRIPTION
Component/System
Functions Correctly
 NO        YES
qi
Ft1
The Decision Box represents the
functionality of a component/system.
The NO box represents failure to
perform correctly, the probability of
which is obtained via a fault tree or single
component failure probability qi
                 Ft1
Fault Tree Arrow represents the number
of the fault tree structure which
corresponds to the decision box
                                         λ =
The initiator triangle represents the
initiating event for a sequence where λ
indicates the rate of occurrence
Time delay 1 indicates that the time
starts from the time at which the delay
symbol is entered and continues up to
the end of the time interval in the delay
symbol
                       
OR gate symbol: Used to simplify the
Cause-Consequence Diagram when more
than one decision box enters the same
decision box or consequence box
Component i exists in a
particular state at time t
  YES         NOQi 1 - Qi
Existence Decision Box represents a
components existing in a certain state
Consequence Box represents the outcome
event due to a particular sequence of
events.
            Table 1 Symbols used for construction of a Cause-Consequence Diagram
t = xhrs
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74. Rules for Construction
Rules for the construction of a cause-consequence diagram can be detailed in two
separate sections, those for the cause part of the diagram and those for the
consequence part of the diagram.  For the cause part it should be noted that the rules
postulated are those used in the construction of a fault tree structure.  The rules for
the construction of the cause diagram can be summarised as a three step procedure:
1) Identification of the Top Event: The construction of the cause diagram begins
with the definition of the undesired event. i.e. the system failure of interest.
2) Cause Diagram Development: Using a deductive process the causes of the
undesired event are discovered and connected by means of logical gates.  The
procedure is repeated until all events have been fully developed, i.e. the basic
events are reached.
3) Validation of the Diagram: For each gate used all inputs must be both necessary
and sufficient to produce the output event.  If this is not the case then the diagram
will not be valid for probability analysis.
Similarly a set of rules were devised for the construction of the consequence diagram:
1)  Component Ordering: The first step of the cause-consequence diagram
construction is deciding on the order in which component failure events are to be
taken.  To ensure a logical development of the causes of the system failure mode it
was decided that the ordering should follow the temporal action of the system, for
example the systems activation for the function required given an initial critical
event.
2)  Consequence Diagram development: The second stage involves the actual
construction of the diagram.  Starting from the initiating component the
functionality of each component or sub-system is investigated and the
consequences of these sequences determined.  If the decision box is governed by a
sub-system then the probability of failure will be obtained via a fault tree diagram.
3)  Reduction: If any decision boxes are deemed irrelevant, for example the boxes
attached to the NO and YES branches are identical and their outcomes and
consequences are the same, then these should be removed and the diagram reduced
to a minimal form.  Removal of these boxes will in no way affect the end result.
85. Rules for Quantification
The procedure for analysing an independent system modelled using a cause-
consequence diagram begins with the assignment of probabilities/frequencies to each
outlet branch stemming from a decision box.  Following this the probability of any one
sequence is obtained by multiplication of the probabilities associated with each
decision box in that sequence (11).  The probability of any particular consequence is
then obtained by the summation of the probability of each sequence that terminates in
that consequence.  This procedure, however, cannot be employed unless the failures
of each decision box in a sequence are independent.  Dependencies can exist in the
cause-consequence diagram and these must be dealt with prior to the quantification of
the diagram.
5.1 Rules for Dependent Failure Events
5.1.1 Common Failure Events
The first dependency that can arise is that the same failure event exists in more than
one fault tree structure on the same path in the cause-consequence diagram.  In order
to deal with a common failure event the event is extracted from the fault tree
structures and placed in a new decision box preceding the first decision box that
contains the common failure event.  The original cause-consequence diagram is then
duplicated on each outlet branch stemming from the new decision box.  Following the
NO outlet branch of the new decision box the probability of failure of the common
failure event is set equal to 1 in any fault tree structure in which it is found.  Similarly
following the YES outlet branch the probability of failure of the common failure event
is set equal to 0 in any fault tree structure in which it is present.
5.1.2 Inconsistent Failure Events
In certain systems components are required to perform different functions which if
successfully accomplished results in the components residing in different states at
different times.  For example initially a valve may be required to be closed and later in
the sequence be open.  For systems that are not in continuous operation certain
component failures could occur between operations.  For example the valve could fail
between operations, which would be the cause of the valve being closed at the start of
the next sequence, and later in the sequence the valve would be unable to open. To
illustrate this the simple cause-consequence diagram section shown in figure 4 can be
utilized with the relevant fault trees depicted in figure 5.
9Figure 4 Example Cause-Consequence Diagram
Figure 5 Fault Trees for example Cause-Consequence Diagram
In this example the component K2 is required to perform two different functions,
firstly to close, decision box 1, and then later in the sequence to open, decision box 3.
 In order to model this type of failure accurately the cause-consequence diagram
requires modification prior to quantification.  Employing a basic event labelling
convention in a fault tree structure can be used to identify an inconsistent failure
event.  If two labels are the same apart from the last character then they are deemed as
inconsistent failure events and the first failure event represents the decision box
containing the first failure mode and the second failure event represents the decision
box containing the second failure mode.  This can be seen for the cause-consequence
diagram in figure 4 where Ft1 contains the basic event K2CO, the first failure mode
and Ft3 contains the basic event K2CC, the second failure mode.  Following the
  Ft1 Ft2 Ft3
K2 fails open
K2CO P1
Motor fails
to start
M P3
K2 fails
closed
K2CC P2
K2 contacts
close            1
 NO      YES
Motor Starts
                    2
 NO      YES
NS
NS: No Start
S: Start
F: Failure K2 contacts
Open           3
NO       YES
F S
Ft1
Ft2
Ft3
NS
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identification of an inconsistent failure event the second failure mode is inspected and
depending on whether the second failure mode is an unrevealed or revealed failure
event the cause-consequence diagram is different.  If the second failure mode is a
revealed failure then it cannot fail between operations and be undetected.  Therefore
the time to failure of the second failure mode is set equal to the time it takes the
system to travel from the first failure event to the second failure event.  If, on the
otherhand, the second failure mode is unrevealed then it can occur between operations
and be undetected.  When this situation occurs the second failure mode is extracted
and placed in an existence decision box preceding the first failure event.  The cause-
consequence diagram is then duplicated on both outlet branches and following the YES
outlet branch of the existence decision box the decision box containing the first failure
mode is governed by the failure of the second failure mode.  The second failure mode
probability is set equal to 1 in all decision boxes beneath the existence decision box
and the first failure mode is set equal to 0. Therefore for figure 4, assuming K2CC is
an unrevealed failure event, the cause-consequence diagram illustrated in figure 6
would be created and reduced to the form shown in figure 7.
Following the NO outlet branch of the existence decision box results in the same
scenario as if the failure had in fact been a revealed failure therefore the second failure
event occurs in the time which it takes the system to travel from the first failure event
to the second failure event.
Figure 6 Modified Cause-Consequence Diagram for Inconsistent failure modes
K2 contac ts
close            1
 NO      YES
Motor Starts
                   2
 NO      YES
NS
NS: No Start
S: Start
F: Failure K2 contacts
Open           3
NO       YES
F S
0
Ft2
1
NS
K2 contac ts
close            5
 NO      YES
Motor Starts
                   6
 NO      YES
NS
K2 contacts
Open           7
NO       YES
F S
Ft4
Ft5
Ft6
NS
K2 contacts exist
failed clo sed
                             4
  YES        NO
1
0
qK2CC
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Figure 7 Reduced Cause-Consequence Diagram for Inconsistent failure modes
Following the inspection of each sequence path in the cause-consequence diagram, and
modification due to any identified dependent failure events, the cause-consequence
diagram can be quantified by multiplying the probability associated with each decision
box in each sequence.  The probability of any consequence is then obtained via the
summation of the probability of any sequence that terminates in that consequence.
6. Pressure Tank System
The system used to illustrate the construction of a cause-consequence diagram is a
pressure tank system that contains a start-up, shutdown sequence in addition to its
operational phase (10).  The system configuration is given in figure 8 and the
components individual functions and failure modes are represented in table 2.
Figure 8 Pressure Tank System
PUMP
OUTLET VALVE
PRESSURE
SWITCH
MOTOR
TIM
RELAY
K1
RELAY
K2
SWIT CH S1
Motor Starts
                     2
 NO      YES
NS
NS: No Start
S: Start
F: Failure
Ft2
 K2 contacts
 close            5
  NO      YES
 Motor Starts
                     6
  NO      YES
NS
 K2 contacts
 Open           7
 NO       YES
F S
Ft4
Ft5
Ft6
NS
K2 contacts exist
failed closed
                            4
YES NO
F
qK2CC
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Component Function Failure Modes Effect on
System
Failure
Type
Switch, S1 To apply power to coil of
K1 relay
S1C: Switch failed closed Circuit remains
energised but
can be broken
by K2
Unrevealed
S1O: Switch failed open No Power to
energise circuit
Revealed
Relay K1 Electrically self-latched
applying power to relay of
K2
K1D:Relay fails de-
energised
No Power to
Circuit
Revealed
K1CC:Contact fails closed Circuit remains
energised but
can be broken
by K2
Unrevealed
K1CO:Contact fails open No Power to
Circuit
Revealed
Relay K2 Delivers power to the
Motor
K2D:Relay fails de-
energised
No power to
Motor
Revealed
K2CC:Contact fails closed Continuous
power to motor
Revealed
K2CO:Contact fails open No power to
Motor
Revealed
Timer Relay
(TIM)
Provides emergency shut-
down in event of pressure
switch failing
TIMCC: Timer contact fails
closed
Circuit
energised but
PRSW can open
Unrevealed
TIMCO: Timer contact fails
open
No power to
motor
Revealed
Pressure Switch
(PRSW)
De-energises coil of K2
when tank is full
PSWC: Fails closed Continuous
power to motor
Revealed
PSWO: Fails Open No power to
motor
Revealed
Fuse To prevent power surge F: Fails Broken No power to
motor
Revealed
Power Supplies 1
& 2
Supplies Power to Relays
and Motor
PS1,PS2: No Power No power to
Motor
Revealed
Motor Pumps fluid into tank M: Fails Broken No power to
pump
Revealed
                                   Table 2 Component Functions and Failure modes
Initially the system is considered to be in a dormant state and therefore de-energised.
The switch S1, the relay contacts K1 and K2 are all open when in the dormant state
and the timer and pressure switch contacts are closed.  Depressing the switch S1
provides power to the coil of K1 which results in the closure of the K1 contacts.  K1
self latches when S1 opens when released and power is also supplied to K2 resulting
in K2 contacts closing which starts the pump motor.  It is assumed that the tank takes
30 minutes to fill and once the pressure threshold is reached the pressure switch
contacts open, de-energising K2 which results in the removal of power from the pump
motor.  After a period of time the tank becomes empty and the pressure switch closes
which energises K2.  The pump restarts and the filling process commence again.  The
tank is filled twice daily and the system is inspected at 6 monthly intervals for
dormant failures.
In the event of the pressure switch failing to open a safety feature is included in the
form of the Timer relay.  Power is applied to the timer relay following the closure of
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the K1 contacts which initiates a clock.  If the clock registers 30 minutes of
continuous pumping then the timer relay contacts are opened which results in a break
in the circuit to K1 and system shutdown.
The rules developed for the construction of a cause-consequence diagram were used to
construct the cause-consequence diagram for the pressure tank system.
Step 1 Component Failure Event Ordering
The ordering of the components for the construction of the cause-consequence
diagram is selected by considering the temporal patterns of the system.  For the
pressure tank system the switch, S1, is depressed followed by it opening.  K1
energises and powers K2 which powers the pump.  Following 30 minutes of
operation the pressure switch should open.  In the event that the pressure switch fails
to open the timer should time out and the timer contacts opened.  Given the pressure
switch opens K2 contacts should de-energise, removing power from the pump.  In the
instance where the timer is required to break the circuit containing K1, K1 contacts
should de-energise removing power from K2 which results in the removal of the
power supply to the pump.  The ordering was therefore chosen to be:
             S1, K1, K2, PRESSURE SWITCH, TIMER RELAY, K1, K2
It can be seen that the components K1 and K2 both occur twice in the ordering
sequence.  This is the result of the system containing two different phases and hence
some components perform different actions in each different phase.  The components
K1 and K2 are both required to close in the start-up sequence and open in the shut-
down sequence.
Step 2 and 3 Cause-Consequence Diagram Construction and Reduction
The cause-consequence diagram was constructed by considering the affect of each
component in the chosen order on the system performance.  In order to highlight
relevant features only one filling sequence is investigated, the cause-consequence
diagram of which is given in figure 9.  The corresponding fault trees are illustrated in
figure 10.
14
                    Figure 9 Cause-Consequence Diagram for Pressure Tank System
S1 Closes
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                     2
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 S = Safe
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 K2 contacts
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 NO       YES
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Ft8
K2 contacts
close             3
NO       YESFt3
E
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K1 contacts
close          7
NO       YESFt7
E
 Motor Starts
                      9
 NO       YESFt9
E
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                    4
NO       YESFt4
E
 Pressure Switch
 Opens          5
 NO       YESFt5
O
 K2 contacts
 Open            6
 NO       YESFt6
O S
 Pressure Switch
 Opens        10
 NO       YESFt10
 K2 contacts
 Open            14
 NO       YESFt14
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Open            11
NO       YESFt11
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Open          12
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O
K2 contacts
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NO       YESFt13
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Figure 10 Fault Trees for Pressure Tank Cause-Consequence Diagram.
System Quantification
Prior to multiplying the probabilities associated with each decision box in each
sequence the cause-consequence diagram was checked for any dependent failure
events.  The following dependent failure events were identified1:
1) Inconsistent failure event present in Ft1 and Ft2 as the switch is required to
close, represented by decision box 1, and then open, represented by decision
box 2.  The second failure event, SIFC, is an unrevealed failure event (Table 2)
and is therefore extracted and placed in an existence decision box preceding
decision box 1.   The Cause-Consequence Diagram is modified using the
procedure detailed in section 5.1.2.
 
                                                
1 Following each of the seven modifications outlined the Cause-Consequence Diagram may change.
These changes result in the duplication of certain parts of the diagram that may contain the inconsistent
failures mentioned.  For example the inconsistent failures detailed in 2 and 3 occur more than once and
are handled in an identical manner.
  Ft1    Ft2    Ft3 Ft4 Ft5
Ft6 Ft7 Ft11 Ft12
Motor Fails
F PS2
K2 fails open
PS1 M
K2D PSWOK2CO
S1 fails open
S1FO
S1 fails
closed
S1FC
Pressure Switch
Fails Closed
PSWC
K2 Contacts
Fail Closed
K2CC
Timer Contacts
Fail Closed
TIMCC
K1 Contacts
Fail Closed
K1CC
K1 fails open
PS1
K1D TIMCOK1CO
where Ft13 = Ft14 = Ft6
          Ft8 = Ft3
          Ft9 = Ft4
          Ft10 = Ft5
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2) Inconsistent failure event present in Ft3 and Ft5 as the pressure switch is
required to be closed and then open.  The second failure event, PSWC, is a
revealed failure event (Table 2) and the time to failure of PSWC is set equal to
30 minutes (the filling time)
 
3) Inconsistent failure event present in Ft3 and Ft6 as K2 contacts are required to
close and following the tank fill, open.  The second failure event, K2CC, is a
revealed failure event (Table 2) and the time to failure of K2CC is set equal to
30 minutes (the filling time)
 
4) Common failure event present in Ft7 and Ft8.   PS1 is extracted and placed in a
new decision box preceding decision box 7.  The Cause-Consequence Diagram
is modified following the procedure detailed in section 5.1.1
 
5) Inconsistent failure event present in Ft7 and Ft12 as K1 contacts are required
to close and then open.  The second failure event, K1CC, is an unrevealed
failure event (Table 2) and is therefore extracted and placed in an existence
decision box.   The Cause-Consequence Diagram is modified using the
procedure detailed in section 5.1.2.
 
6) Inconsistent failure event present in Ft7 and Ft11 as the Timer contacts
closed, and may be required to open later in the sequence.  The second failure
event, TIMCC, is an unrevealed failure event (Table 2) and is therefore
extracted and placed in an existence decision box.  The Cause-Consequence
Diagram is modified using the procedure detailed in section 5.1.2.
Following the appropriate modification, due to the dependent failure events identified,
the final Cause-Consequence Diagram was developed and is shown in figure 11a and
11b, with the corresponding fault trees given in figure 12.
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Figure 11a First page of final Cause-Consequence Diagram for the Pressure Tank
System
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Figure 11b Second page of final Cause-Consequence Diagram for the Pressure Tank
System
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Figure 12 Fault tree Structures for figure 11
The probability of the system entering an overpressurized state was obtained using
the component failure data shown in table 3.
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Component Failure Rate Inspection Interval,
θ
Mean Time to
Repair,τ
Switch, S1 S1FC: 1x10-6
S1FO:8.698x10-4
4368.0
NA
36.0
 NA
Relay K1 K1D: 0.23x10-6
K1CC: 0.23x10-6
K1CO: 0.23x10-6
NA
4368.0
NA
NA
36.0
NA
Relay K2 K2D: 0.23x10-6
K2CC: 0.23x10-6
K2CO: 0.23x10-6
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Timer Relay TCC:1x10-4
TCO: 1x10-4
4368.0
NA
36.0
NA
Pressure Switch PSWC: 1x10-4
PSWO: 1x10-4
NA
NA
NA
NA
Fuse F: 1x10-5 NA NA
Power Supplies 1 & 2 PS11x10-6
PS2: 1x10-6
NA
NA
NA
NA
Motor M: 1x10-6 NA NA
                      Table 3 Failure Data for Pressure Tank System
The system functions twice daily and therefore the time between operations is 12
hours.  The probability of failure for revealed failures between operations was hence
obtained using equation (1) with t=12 hours.  For unrevealed failures the probability
of failure was obtained using θ and τ, given in table 3, and equation (2).
Q = 1-e-λt (1)
QAV = λ
θ
τ⋅ + 2 (2)
The probability of each fault tree was calculated using the inclusion-exclusion method
(7) and the probability of overpressure was obtained by summing the probabilities of
any sequence that terminated in the consequence 'O'.  There existed 12 such paths and
the probability of overpressure was calculated to equal 1.12x10-5.  In addition to
obtaining the probability of overpressure the probability of the tank being empty, a
safe operation and a normal operation can also be calculated and shown to equal:
P(Normal Operation) = 0.766
P(Safe Operation) = 0.2213
P(Empty Tank) = 1.21x10-2
7. Conclusions
The main advantage of the FTA method is that the failure logic of a system is well
documented on the fault tree structure.  Conventional fault tree quantification however
requires a number of assumptions, which renders the analysis of sequential or
dependent systems inaccurate.  For such systems an accurate analysis can be obtained
via a Markov model, however the state-transition diagram used in the Markov
analysis holds no textual description regarding the failure logic of the system.
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The cause-consequence diagram method enables sequential or dependent systems to
be modelled accurately with the retention of the failure logic for the system.  In
addition to this more than one consequence can be modelled at a time as the cause-
consequence diagram documents all system outcomes from a given critical event.  In
order to extend the capabilities of the cause-consequence diagram method a list of
construction and quantification rules have been developed and illustrated using an
example system.  In particular this paper provides more rigorous definitions of the
symbols used and the approach to be adopted to construct the Cause –Consequence
Diagram.  A new symbol is introduced to distinguish between events which exist at a
specified time and those which occur at that time.  Once the Cause-Consequence
Diagram is constructed its quantification can be complicated by dependencies between
the events represented by the decision boxes.  An approach to resolve this problem is
given which can be automated within a computational analysis methodology.
Dependencies attributed to either repeated events or inconsistent events can be
accounted for in this way.
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